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Case No. 20110254
INTHE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Ricky Cunningham,
Petitioner/Appellant,
vs.

State of Utah,
Respondent/Appellee.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from an order dismissing a petition for post-conviction
relief, challenging a guilty plea to murder and felony DUI in the Seventh Judicial
District Court, Grand County, the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson presiding. This
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (West 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the post-conviction court correctly rule that the Petition was nearly

four years too late and, therefore, barred by the one-year statute of limitations
provided in Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA)?
2.

Did the post-conviction court correctly rule that Petitioner's tardiness in

filing his Petition was not excused by the PCRA's equitably tolling provision?
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3.

Was Petitioner's tardiness excused by an "interests of justice"

exception, even though the Utah Legislature removed that exception from the PCRA
in 2008 and the Utah Supreme Court has never recognized the exception to be
required by the Utah Constitution?
Standard of Review. "'We review an appeal from an order dismissing or
denying a petition for post-conviction relief for correctness without deference to
the lower court's conclusions of law.'" Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, f 55,234
P.3d 1115,1133 cert, denied, 130 S. Ct. 3450 (2010).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107 (West 2009) is dispositive and is attached as
Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF FACTS and STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner admitted he killed his live-in girlfriend, Rhonda Rosenbalm, by
running her over with a car. See Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea
and Certificate of Counsel ("Plea Statement"), R. 66-80, Addendum B. "Rhonda's
death was a result of my depraved indifference, as described in Utah's murder
statute." R. 69.
He also admitted that after striking and killing Rhonda, he crashed into a
parked truck occupied by a young couple and their baby. Id.

2
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Jesse Smith, one of the occupants of the truck, testified that he saw Petitioner
and Rhonda arguing. R. 50. Smith said the argument escalated and soon Petitioner
punched Rhonda, then ran her off the road with the car when she tried to flee. Id.
Smith told his wife: "We need to do somethin'. This is — this is wrong. You know,
this — this is — doesn't need to happen." Id. Smith honked the truck's horn and he
and his wife motioned Rhonda to take refuge in the truck. Id. at 51.
Rhonda ran towards them, but before she could reach the truck, Petitioner
struck her with the car again at speeds Smith estimated at 75-80 miles per hour. Id.
Petitioner then crashed into Smith's truck. Id. The impact pushed the truck
over a cliff and, Petitioner admits, "could have caused the death of or serious bodily
injury to the people in the truck ..." Id.
According to Smith, the impact "spun us out and pushed us off of a - about a
50-foot embankment, ah, which stopped on a tree. But if it wouldn't, we would
have —you know, wouldn't be here today." Id.
Once his truck came to rest against the tree, Smith ran back up the
embankment to find Rhonda's body in the middle of the road. Id. Smith knew
Rhonda was dead because "she was missin' parts and, you know, she was pretty
mangled up from that." Id.
Petitioner admitted — and toxicology results showed — that his blood alcohol
level was more than double the legal limit for driving a car. Id. (citing Utah Code
3
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Ann. § 41-6-44(2)(a)(iii) (West 2009)). He also admitted that he had two prior DUI's
in Texas in the last 10 years and that he was legally prohibited from driving at all.
Id. at52.
Petitioner was charged inter alia with one count of murder (domestic
violence), a first-degree felony; three counts of attempted murder, each a seconddegree felony; one count of aggravated assault (domestic violence), a third-degree
felony; driving under the influence of alcohol (third offense), a third-degree felony;
and two counts of assault (domestic violence), class B misdemeanors. Information,
dated August 16,2004 ("Information"), R. 59-63.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner admitted to murder and DUI. Plea
Statement, R. 67-68. In exchange for the guilty plea, the State dismissed the
remaining charges and agreed to take no position on sentencing. R. 73-74.
Petitioner was sentenced to a mandatory five-years-to-life sentence on the
murder charge and zero to five years for DUI.

Judgment and Order of

Commitment, dated May 31, 2005 ("Sentence"), R. 83-84. The trial court ordered
that the sentences run consecutively. R. 84.
Petitioner did not appeal.
1

On March 18,2010, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. R. 318.

4
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The post-conviction court dismissed the Petition, ruling that it was barred by
the one-year statute of limitations for post-conviction relief. Order, dated February
24,2011, R. 127-29 ("the Order"), Addendum C
Petitioner timely appealed.

~

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I: Petitioner missed the deadline for post-conviction relief by nearly
four years. Accordingly, the post-conviction court properly ruled that Petitioner's
claims are time-barred.
Point II: The post-conviction court properly ruled that Petitioner's tardiness
in pursuing post-conviction claims of ineffective assistance against his attorney
could not be excused by the equitable tolling exception to the one-year statute of
limitations.
Point III: Petitioner's claim that his tardiness is excused by an "interests of
justice" exception fails because the Utah Legislature removed the "interests of
justice" exception to the PCRA's one-year statute of limitations and the Utah
Supreme Court has never recognized the exception to be required by the Utah
Constitution.

5
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ARGUMENT
I.
THE POST-CONVICTION COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE
PETITION BECAUSE IT WAS NEARLY FOUR YEARS TOO LATE.
The post-conviction court properly dismissed the Petition because it was
almost four-years too late.
The Post-Conviction Remedies Act ("PCRA") establishes a one-year statute of
limitations for post-conviction claims. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107 (West 2009).
Under the PCRA, petitioner's cause of action accrued on June 30, 2005 — 30 days
after he was sentenced and the last day for filing an appeal. See Utah Code Ann. §
78B-9-107(2)(a) and Utah R. App. P. 4. Thus, to be timely, the Petition should have
been filed by June 30,2006. Because petitioner did not file his Petition until March
18,2010—nearly four years too late—the post-conviction court correctly dismissed
the Petition as time-barred.

6
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II.
THE POST-CONVICTION COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT
PETITIONER'S TARDINESS IN FILING HIS PETITION WAS
NOT EXCUSED BY THE EQUITABLE TOLLING EXCEPTION.
On appeal, Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in not
granting his petition because his attorney, Andrew Fitzgerald,1 was ineffective for
not considering possible defenses that could have been raised based on Petitioner's
"highly intoxicated state" and his bipolar disorder, which Petitioner claims could
have negated the mens rea needed to commit his crimes. Aplt. Br. at 1,12. Petitioner
also claims that his attorney lured him into pleading guilty by promising him that
he would serve less time in prison. Id. at 1, 12-13. Petitioner concedes that he
learned his counsel had advised him incorrectly "[a]fter serving several months in
prison/' Id. at 4.
The post-conviction court properly ruled that Petitioner's ineffective
assistance claims were time-barred because he either knew or should have known of
the claims years before he filed his post-conviction petition on March 19,2009. "The
court is fully convinced that Cunningham knew, or with the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have known, long before March 1[9], 2009, of all the issues he
raises in the Petition." Order at 4 (Addendum C).

1

Fitzgerald is currently serving as Grand County Attorney. Happy Morgan
was the county attorney in 2005 when Petitioner entered his guilty plea.
7
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In amending the time-bar provisions of the PCRA, the Legislature did not
eliminate all exceptions for a late filing. Rather, it replaced the "interests of justice"
exception with a tolling provision. That provision tolls the one-year period "for any
period during which the petitioner was prevented from filing a petition due to state
action in violation of the United States Constitution, or due to physical or mental
incapacity." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107(3). As written, amended 107 will timebar a claim only when a petitioner fails to pursue it with reasonable diligence and
free of obstructions by unconstitutional state action or mental or physical
impairment. Petitioner fails to even allege that he meets the requirements for tolling
the one-year time limit.
Amended section 107 generally tracks the federal limitations statute, which
requires a petitioner to file within one year, but includes provisions to account for
later discovered evidence and unconstitutional state action that prevents a timely
filing. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).2 It appears that "[e]very court which has addressed
the issue — i.e., whether, as a general matter § 2244(d) constitutes an unconstitutional
suspension of the writ—has concluded that it does not." Wyzyowski v. Dept. of

2

Amended section 107 actually is more generous in that it also tolls the one
year limitation period when a petitioner cannot file due to mental or physical
incapacity. Section 2244 includes no similar provision relief.
8
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Corrections, 226 F.3d 1213,1217 (11th Cir. 2000). Petitioner cites no authority and
provides no analysis as to why the Utah Constitution requires a different result.
For the reasons argued, Petitioner has not shown that the postconviction court erred in applying the time bar or that amended section 107 is
unconstitutional.
III.
PETITIONER'S TARDINESS IN FILING HIS PETITION WAS
NOT EXCUSED BY AN "INTERESTS OF JUSTICE" EXCEPTION.
Petitioner has never disputed that his Petition is nearly four years too late.
Rather, he claims, first, that the PCRA's time-bar is unconstitutional because it
has no provision excusing tardiness in "the interests of justice/7 Aplt. Br. at 6.
Second, he claims that the post-conviction court erred in rejecting Petitioner's
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Aplt. Br. at 1.
Petitioner is incorrect because the post-conviction court correctly held that the
Utah Supreme Court has never constitutionalized the "interests of justice"
exception. "This court agrees with the State that the Utah Supreme Court has not
invalidated any and all limitation periods for post-conviction petitions. Some
statutory bard withstand constitutional scrutiny and must be upheld." Order at 2.
The Utah Constitution does not give a convicted person the right to have a
conviction reviewed for constitutional error in a post-conviction proceeding or

9
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prohibit the Legislature from regulating post-conviction review.

The 2008

legislative amendments to the time-bar provision contain no "interests of justice"
exception; rather the new statute only time-bars post-conviction claims that a
petitioner fails to pursue with reasonable diligence and unobstructed by
unconstitutional state action. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107. Petitioner has not
shown that he has a constitutional right to broader access to post-conviction review.
A.

The Utah Supreme Court Has Made Clear That The
Judiciary Will Review Post-Conviction Proceedings Within
The Parameters Of The PCRA.

The Utah Supreme Court has held that "the power to review post-conviction
petitions '[qjuintessentially . . . belongs to the judicial branch of government.'"
Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 UT 42 \ 17,94 P.3d 263 (quoting Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029,
1033 (Utah 1989) (discussing the scope of the writ of habeas corpus in the Utah
constitution)). In reliance on that conclusion, the Utah Supreme Court has reasoned
that "'the legislature may not impose restrictions which limit [post-conviction relief]
as a judicial rule of procedure, except as provided in the constitution.'" Gardner,
2004 UT 42, \ 17 (citation omitted).
But Utah Supreme Court precedent does not render the restrictions contained
in the amended time-bar provisions unconstitutional. To the contrary, the Utah
Supreme Court, through its rule making authority, has determined that the judiciary
will exercise its constitutional power over post-conviction cases within the confines
10
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of the PCRA, which includes amendments to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107.
In 2010, the Utah Supreme Court amended Utah R. Civ. P. 65C. Rule 65C(a)
now provides that the PCRA "sets forth the manner and extent to which a person
may challenge the validity of a criminal conviction and sentence after the conviction
and sentence have been affirmed in a direct appeal/7 Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(a) (2010).
The Advisory Committee Notes state that the rule amendments "embrace Utah's
Post-Conviction Remedies Act as the law governing post-conviction relief." They
continue that "[i]t is the committee's view that the added restrictions which the Act
places on post-conviction petitions do not amount to a suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus."
By itself, rule 65C(a) defeats Petitioner's constitutional challenge.
B.

The Utah Supreme Court Has Not Constitutionalized The
"Interests Of Justice" Exception and Petitioner Has Not
Otherwise Shown That Amended Section 107 Is
Insufficiently Flexible To Meet Constitutional
Requirements.

Relying primarily on Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249 (Utah 1998), Petitioner argues
that the Utah Supreme Court has held that a post-conviction time-bar statute that
does not include an "interests of justice" exception is unconstitutional. See, e.g.,
Aplt. Br. at 8. Petitioner is incorrect.
When the Julian court analyzed the "interests of justice" exception in a oneyear limitations statute that preceded the PCRA, it rejected the State's argument that
11
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the statutory language should be narrowly construed. The court held that reaching
the merits of a meritorious post-conviction claim always would be in the "interests
of justice." Julian, 966 P.2d at 253-54.
It is true that the Julian court commented "that no statute of limitations may
be constitutionally applied to bar a habeas petition." Id. at 254. However, mat
language was not controlling because Julian did not "directly challenge" the timebar's constitutionality, and the supreme court granted relief on the basis of statutory
construction. Id.; see Swart v. State, 1999 UT App 96 f 3, 976 P.2d 100 (recognizing
that the comment about the constitutionality of a limitations statute was dicta only);
see also Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62 If 9,123 P.3d 400 (recognizing the principle that
the court should not reach a constitutional issue when it can resolve an issue on
statutory grounds); Specter Motor Service v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101,105 (1944) ("If
there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of
constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of
constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable").
After Julian, the supreme court next considered the "interests of justice"
language in Frausto v. State, 966 P.2d 849 (Utah 1998). Unlike Julian, Frausto directly
challenged the time-bar's constitutionality. Id. at 851. The Frausto plurality author
quoted his language from Julian that "'no statute of limitations may be
constitutionally applied to bar a habeas petition.'" Id. (Russon,}., with one justice
12
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concurring). However, that opinion did not carry a majority.

Two justices

concurred only in the result, id. at 851 — i.e., that a court must always consider the
statutory "interests of justice" exception—and one wrote separately that he
"disagree[d] with the main opinion's holding that 'a petitioner's failure to comply
with a statute of limitations may never be a proper ground upon which to dismiss a
habeas corpus petition/" Id. at 852; see also Swart, 1999 UT App 96, f 3 (recognizing
that the language at issue did not carry a majority).3
Finally, in Adams, the Utah Supreme Court again relied on its interpretation of
the statutory "interests of justice" language. Adams, 2005 UT 62, | f 8-9,14-15. In
fact, the court expressly declined to address Adams' constitutional challenge to the
time-bar because it resolved the case on statutory grounds. Id. at f 9.
Thus, despite Petitioner's claims to the contrary, the Utah Supreme Court has
never held that a time-bar to a post-conviction claim would be unconstitutional
without an "interests of justice" exception. Petitioner wholly fails to address how
amended section 107 lacks sufficient flexibility to meet constitutional standards even

3

Even the Frausto plurality seemed to recognize that its constitutional
language in Julian was not controlling. The court stated, "While we did not address
the constitutionality of section 78-35a-107 in Julian, we clearly stated that proper
consideration of meritorious claims raised in a habeas petition will always be in the
interests of justice."
13
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

without an exception titled "interests of justice."4
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted February f (a 2012, »
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

<UytV5T) .OPd^r

BRETT J.

DELPQjfro
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee

4

Petitioner recites language from Julian suggesting that legislatively imposed
time limits are a "violation of the separation of powers and the open courts
provision of the Declaration of Rights." Aplt. Br. at 9; see also Julian v. State, 966 P.2d
249, 253 (Utah 1998). Because Petitioner has failed to properly develop these
arguments, his mere mention of them constitutes inadequate briefing and this Court
should not consider them. "Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
'requires not just bald citation to authority but development of that authority and
reasoned analysis based on that authority.'" Helbach v. State, 2009 UT App 375U
(Memorandum Decision) (quoting State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299,305 (Utah 1998)); see
also State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539 (Utah 1998) ("Inadequately briefed arguments
would not be considered on appeal from conviction"); State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App
170, t 13, 72 P.3d 138 (issue inadequately briefed when the overall analysis is so
lacking "as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court").
14
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Addendum A

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107. Statute of limitations for postconviction relief
(1) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year after the cause of action has
accrued.
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of the following dates:
• (a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of conviction, if no appeal is
taken;
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction over the case, if an appeal is
taken;
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court or the United States
Supreme Court, if no petition for writ of certiorari is filed;
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry of the decision on the petition
for certiorari review, if a petition for writ of certiorari is filed;
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of
evidentiary facts on which the petition is based; or
(f) the date on which the new rule described in Subsection 78B-9-104(l)(f) is established.
(3) The limitations period is tolled for any period during which the petitioner was prevented from filing a
petition due to state action in violation of the United States Constitution, or due to physical or mental
incapacity. The petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner
is entitled to relief under this Subsection (3).
(4) The statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of the outcome of a petition asserting:
(a) exoneration through DNA testing under Section 78B-9-303: or
(b) factual innocence under Section 78B-9-401.
(5) Sections 77-19-8, 78B-2-104, and 78B-2-111 do not extend the limitations period established in this
section.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 2008. c. 3. § 1171. eff. Feb. 7. 2008: Laws 2008. c. 288. § 6. eff. Mav 5. 2008: Laws 2008. c. 358. §
1. eff May 5. 2008.
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Laws 2008, c. 288, § 6, added subsec. (2)(f) and rewrote subsec. (3) which formerly read:
"(3) If the court finds that the interests of justice require, a court may excuse a petitioner's failure to file
within the time limitations."
Laws 2008, c. 358, § 1, inserted subsec. (4) and redesignated subsec. (4) as subsec. (5).
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Composite section by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel of Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1171,
Laws 2008, c. 288, § 6 and Laws 2008, c. 358, § 1.
Prior Laws:
Laws 1979, c. 133.
Laws 1995, c. 82, § 1.
Laws 1996, c. 235, § 7.
Laws 2004, c. 139, §2.
C. 1953, §78-35a-107.
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Addendum B

^-*<&!fc-County
u-o

APR 1 9 2005,
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HAPPY J. MORGAN, # 7586
Grand County Attorney
125 East Center Street
Moab, UT 84532
Telephone: (435) 259-1326
PATRICK B. NOLAN, # 2422
Assistant Attorney General
5272 S. College Drive, Suite 200
Murray, UT 84123
Telephone: (801)281-1200
Attorneys for The State of Utah

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

RICKY JAMES CUNNINGHAM, JR.,

Case No. 041700155 FS
Judge Lyle R. Anderson

Defendant.

I, Ricky James Cunningham, Jr., hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised
of and that I understand the following facts and rights:

Notification of Charges
I am pleading guilty to the following crimes:
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Crimes & Statutory
Provisions

Degree

Punishment
Min/Max and/or
Minimum Mandatory

Murder, U.C.A. § 76-5-203
(Domestic Violence)

First Degree
Felony

Maximum: 5 years to life; $10,000
fine. Minimum: mandatory
commitment to prison (not eligible
for probation).

Driving Under the Influence of
Alcohol (Two or More Prior
Convictions within 10 Years),
U.C.A. §41-6-44(6)

Third Degree
Felony

Maximum: 0 - 5 years in prison;
$5,000.00 fine. Minimum (if placed
on probation): mandatory 1,500
hours in jail; fine not less than
$1,500.00.

I have received a copy of the Amended Information filed against me. I have read it, or
had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of the crimes to which I am
pleading guilty.
The elements of the crimes to which I am pleading guilty are:
COUNT 1: MURDER (Domestic Violence).
1. On or about August 10, 2004, in Grand County, Utah,
2. The defendant, Ricky James Cunningham, Jr.,
EITHER:
(a) intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Rhonda Rosenbalm;
OR,
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(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, committed an act clearly dangerous to
human life that caused the death of Rhonda Rosenbalm;
OR,
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, engaged in
conduct which created a grave risk of death to another, and thereby caused the death of Rhonda
Rosenbalm; and
3. Rhonda Rosenbalm and I were cohabitants, as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-1.
COUNT 6: DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL.
1. On or about August 10, 2004, in Grand County, Utah,
2. The defendant, Ricky James Cunningham, Jr., did operate or was in actual physical control, of
a vehicle while having sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test showed that
he had a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test.
3. The defendant has two or more prior convictions within ten (10) years of this offense.
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes listed
above. I want to plead guilty to Count 1 by admitting that the third alternative (element 2(c)
above) describes what I did. I do not wish to admit that I killed Rhonda Rosenbalm intentionally
or knowingly; nor that I intended to cause serious bodily injury to her. I understand that if I
admit that I killed her under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life,
under Utah law, that constitutes murder. I admit and claim that the following facts describe my
conduct. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty pleas, and prove the
elements of the crimes to which I am pleading guilty:
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Defendant's Factual Statement
On or about August 10, 2004, Rhonda Rosenbalm and I drove from Grand Junction,
Colorado to Moab, Utah in her 1983 Buick Riviera. The car had just been tuned up that
morning. Since it was a hot summer afternoon, when we arrived in town, we went to Woody's
bar and spent the afternoon drinking beer. Later that evening, we stopped at Wendy's for a
hamburger, and then drove out to Arches National Park.
When we got to a turnout on top, we began to argue. Rhonda got out of the car. I hit her
twice and ran her off the road with the car. There was a flat-bed truck parked at the turnout with
three (3) people, a young couple and their baby, in the cab. I drove on up the road and turned
around. I then drove back down the hill at a very high rate of speed, crossing into the wrong
lane, and then ran into Rhonda, who was on the far left side of the road. The car then ran into the
truck and pushed it over the edge of the cliff. Rhonda's car then burst into flames.
I admit that my conduct evidences a depraved indifference to human life, and that I
knowingly engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death to Rhonda, thereby causing
her death. I also acknowledge the following: that I was driving the 1983 Buick Riviera, when I
was prohibited by law from driving any motor vehicle because I had no driver's license; that I
had been drinking all afternoon, and that I was intoxicated; and that my actions caused the death
of Rhonda Rosenbalm, and could have caused the death of or serious bodily injury to the people
in the truck which I hit and pushed over the edge of the cliff.
Rhonda's death was a result of my depraved indifference, as described in Utah's murder
statute.
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I understand that this is my version of what happened, and that if I were to be convicted
by a jury of murder, the jury would not specify which of the alternative mental states they found
to apply: whether intentional, knowing, intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, or
acting with depraved indifference. However, it matters to me which alternative I admit. I admit
that I killed Rhonda in a manner evidencing depraved indifference. I deny that I intentionally or
knowingly killed Rhonda, or that I intended to cause serious bodily injury to her.
I admit that my blood alcohol concentration was .20 grams at the scene of the crime.
I have been previously convicted on at least two occasions of Driving While Intoxicated
in the State of Texas within the last ten (10) years.
Waiver of Constitutional Rights
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under
the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty I will
give up all the following rights:
Counsel. I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot
afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand that I might
later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's
sendee to me.
I have not waived my right to counsel. I certify that I have read this statement and
that I understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty. I
also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of my guilty pleas.
My attorney is K. Andrew Fitzgerald. My attorney and I have fully discussed this
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statement, my rights, and the consequences of my guilty pleas.
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
(unbiased) jury. I also understand that if I ask to have the judge decide the case instead of a jury,
if the prosecution and the judge agree to that, then my case would be decided by an impartial
judge. I will be giving up the right to trial by either judge or jury by pleading guilty.
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a
trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me; and b)
my attorney, or if I waived my right to an attorney, I would myself, have the opportunity to crossexamine all of the witnesses who testified against me.
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a trial, I could call witnesses if
I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of
those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would pay
those costs.
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to have
a trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose not to
testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I also know that
if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal to testify against me.
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty, I
am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged crimes. If I choose to
fight the charges against me, I need only plead unot guilty," and my case will be set for a trial. At
a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each element of the charges beyond a
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reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each
juror would have to find me guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before I could be convicted.
I understand that if I plead guilty, I give up the presumption of innocence and will be
admitting that I committed the crimes stated above.
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, I
would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an
appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up my right to
appeal my conviction if I plead guilty. I understand that if I wish to appeal my sentence, I must
file a notice of appeal within 30 days after my sentence is entered.
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above.
Consequences of Entering a Guilty Plea
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentences that may be imposed for the crimes
to which I am pleading guilty. I know that by pleading guilty to any crime that carries a
mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving a mandatory penalty for that crime. I
know my sentence must include a prison term, and may also include a fine. I understand by
pleading guilty to murder I will not be eligible for probation, meaning that commitment to prison
is mandatory for an indeterminate term of at least 5 years, and which may be for life.
I know that in addition to any fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victims of my crimes,
including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of this plea
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agreement.
I also understand that I am pleading guilty to an offense that is classified as a domestic
violence offense. Wliile that does not enhance the penalty for this offense, I understand that if I
am convicted of another domestic violence offense within five years, that subsequent domestic
violence offense might be enhanced by raising the offense and punishment by one degree,
pursuant to U.C.A. §77-36-1.1.
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run at the
same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime that I
plead to.
I also know if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of
which I have been convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my guilty plea now may result in
consecutive sentences being imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty
occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose
consecutive sentences, unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences
would be inappropriate.
Plea agreement. My guilty pleas are the result of a plea agreement between myself and
the prosecuting attorneys. All the promises, duties, and provisions of the plea agreement, if any,
are fully contained in this statement, including those explained below:
Upon the Court's acceptance of the guilty pleas as noted above,
1. The State will move to dismiss all other counts set forth in the Amended Information,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

s

• 000

effective thirty (30) days after sentencing.
2. I will pay Court-ordered restitution for Rhonda's funeral expenses, in the amount
determined by the Department of Corrections.
3.

I will pay Court-ordered restitution to Jesse Smith, in the amount determined by

the Department of Corrections.
4. I understand that if the judge accepts my pleas of guilty, that Utah law requires that I
be sentenced to prison for an indeterminate term of five years to life, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-406, for the crime of murder.
5. The prosecutors will take no position with respect to the imposition of consecutive
sentences or fines by the Court at the time of sentencing.
Trial judge not bound.
I know that any charge or sentencing concession, or recommendation of probation or
suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charge for sentencing, made or sought by either
defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney, is not binding on the judge. I also know that any
opinions they express to me as to what they believe the judge may do are not binding on the
judge.
I also understand that a sentence of an indeterminate term of imprisonment from five
years to life is mandatory and is required by law in this case.
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Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness
I am entering these pleas of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, or unlawful
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty. No promises except those
contained in this statement have been made to me.
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand its
contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete
anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the
statements are correct.
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
I am 26 years of age. I have attended school through the 11th grade. I can read and
understand the English language. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or
intoxicants which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently
under the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment.
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing or
from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my pleas.
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilt}/ pleas, I must file a written motion
to withdraw my pleas before sentence is announced. I will only be allowed to withdraw my
pleas upon leave of the court, if I show that they were not knowingly and voluntarily made.
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I understand that any challenge to my pleas made after sentencing must be pursued under
the Post-Conviction Remedies Act in Title 78, Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
Dated this 19th day of April 2005.

H.

ti9kyJJames Cunninglytm, Jr.
Ric^y
DEFENDANT
/
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Certificate of Defense Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney for Ricky James Cunningham, Jr., the defendant, and that I
know he has read the statement or that I have read it to him. I have discussed it with him and
believe that he fully understands the meaning of its contents, and is mentally and physically
competent. I affirmatively state that I have no question concerning the defendant's competency.
To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the
crimes and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and
these, along with the other representations and declarations made by the defendant in the
foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true.

K. ANDREW FITZG^RALD^
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
Bar No. 8944
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Certificate of Prosecuting Attorneys
We certify that we are the attorneys for the State of Utah in the case against Ricky James
Cunningham, Jr., defendant. We have reviewed this Statement of Defendant. We agree that the
defendant's claims which form the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct, when combined
with his claimed mens rea, constitute one form of the crime of murder to which he is pleading guilty.
We also agree that the facts which he claims (as distinguished from his mental state) are true. We
believe that the evidence of his mens rea, when combined with Hie facts, supports a plea of guilty,
and constitutes the offense of murder under Utah law. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion
to encourage this plea have been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in the
Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement, or are as supplemented on the record before the Court.
There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction of defendant for
the offenses for which these pleas are entered; and that since a jury would not return a verdict that
distinguishes between the mens rea alternative elements in this case on the charge of murder, the
acceptance of these pleas would serve the public interest.

>PY J. MORGAN
Grand County Attorney
Bar No. 7586

PATRICK B. NOLAN
Assistant Attorney General
Bar No. 2422
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Order
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement, and the certification of the
defendant and counsel, and based on oral representations in court, the Court witnesses the
signatures and finds that the defendant's guilty pleas are freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty pleas to the crimes set forth in the
Statement be accepted and entered.
Dated this

day of April, 2005.

COURT:

m

r^lutji^

„ . LANDERSON
S ^ S T ® ^ ^ T R I C T COURT JUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 041700155 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Mail

Dated this^^^^aay of

NAME .
K ANDREW FITZGERALD
ATTORNEY DEF
55 E 100 S
MOAB, UT 84532
HAPPY J MORGAN
ATTORNEY PLA
125 E CENTER
MOAB UT 84532
PATRICK B. NOLAN
ATTY
5272 S COLLEGE DRIVE
SUITE 200
MURRAY UT 84123
20 0^
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ATTORNEY GENERAL
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT

PILED

APPEALS
THE SEVENTH DISTRICT

FEB 2 4 2011

JUDICIAL COURT IN AND FOR
STATE OF UTAH

GRAND COUNTY
GR&N&-Ci2iajTY

ORDER

RICKY JAMES CUNNINGHAM,
Plaintiff,
vs

Case No, 100700055
STATE OF UTAH
Judge Lyle R. Anderson

Defendants,

Petitioner Ricky James Cunningham ("Cunningham") filed his
Petition for Post Conviction Relief and for Writ of Hapeas Corpus
(the "Petition") on March 18, 2010.

This court ordered a

response from the State of Utah (the "State") on May 12, 2010.
The State filed its Motion for Summary Judgment Dismissing
Petition for Post Conviction Relief (the "Motion") on July 16,
2010.

Cunningham filed his Opposition to State's Motion for

Summary Judgment on July 30, 2010.

The State filed State's Reply

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on August
19,

2010.

On December 20, 2010, Cunningham filed Petitioner's

Response to State's Motion for Summary Judgment and on February
18,

2011, Cunningham filed a Notice to Submit for Decision.
Cunningham pled guilty on April 19, 2005, to Murder and to

felony DUI.

Cunningham signed a Statement of Defendant in

Support of Guilty Pleas and Certificate of Counsel (the

1
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"Defendant's Statement") which included a detailed description of
what Cunningham had done.

He admitted he had engaged in conduct

that created a grave risk of death to his girlfriend, Rhonda
Rosenbalm.

He admitted that his conduct evidenced a depraved

indifference to human life.

On May 31, 2005, Cunningham was

sentenced to five years to life, and up to five years, in the
Utah State Prison, to be served consecutively.
Cunningham maintains in his Petition that his trial counsel
was constitutionally deficient because 1) counsel misstated how
long Cunningham would spend in prison, 2) counsel failed to
investigate the effect of Cunningham's intoxication on his mental
state, and 3) counsel failed to investigate the effect of
Cunningham's bipolar disorder on his mental state.

The Motion

does not address these claims, but raises instead the statutory
bar of section 78B-9-107, Utah Code, which bars claims of which
"petitioner knew or should have know in the exercise of
reasonable diligence" at least one year before the Petition was
filed.
This court agrees with the State that the Utah Supreme Court
has not invalidated any and all limitation periods for postconviction petitions.

Some statutory bars withstand

constitutional scrutiny and must be upheld.

Section 107 purports

2
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to bar all claims of which Cunningham knew, or should have known,
with the exercise of reasonable diligence, by March 19, 2009, one
year before Cunningham filed the Petition.

This date is almost

four years after Cunningham was sentenced.
The issue of intoxication is not new in this case.

In fact,

Cunningham specifically admitted having been intoxicated on
August 10, 2004, the date of his crimes. And, while this court
recalls no discussion of Cunningham's bipolar disorder in his
appearance before the court, Cunningham himself was clearly aware
of his bipolar diagnosis.

While the court does not expect the

accused in any case to be an expert on alcohol intoxication or
mental illness, the court believes from its own experience that
virtually every person who appears before the court is aware that
alcohol impairment and impairment from mental illness are issues
that may affect culpability and punishment.

There is no

reasonable likelihood that Cunningham was oblivious to these
issues between August 10, 2004, and March 18, 2009.
With respect to the claim that trial counsel misstated the
likely period of Cunningham's incarceration., this court notes
that the Defendant's Statement clearly states that Cunningham
could be incarcerated for five years to life, plus up to five
more years.

This court also reminded Cunningham during the plea

3
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colloquy of this possible consequence.

And if Cunningham had any

doubts about who would set the limits of his incarceration, he
would quickly have learned the truth within a few months of
entering the Utah State Prison.
The court is thus fully convinced that Cunningham knew, or
with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, long
before March 18, 2009, of all of the issues he raises in the
Petition.

The Motion is therefore granted and the Petition is

hereby denied.
This is the order of the court.

No further order is

required.

Dated this

day of February, 2011.
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 100700055 by the method and on the date
specified.
MAIL: BRETT J DELPORTO 160 E 300 S 6TH FLR POB 140854 SALT LAKE
CITY, UT 84114-0854
MAIL: JENNIFER K GOWANS PO BOX 982047 PARK CITY UT 84098-2047

Date:
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Deputy Court Clerk
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